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Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing
International Relations ?
Bertrand Badie is professor at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris, where 
he teaches International Relations. However, Badie’s involvement in “Interna­
tional Relations” (IR) is recent. Most of his publications deal with state building 
and comparative politics where international aspects are no doubt important but 
not central.' Badie’s recent involvement in IR is the logical outcome of his 
earlier work. Both his critique of theories and concepts claiming universal 
validity and his studies of political development inside and outside Western 
Europe lead to a recognition of the plurality of meanings and of the concrete 
problems that arise when several coexisting perceptions of the world interact, 
dominate and change each other. In his view, the legitimacy crisis of states 
outside the West is the result of a contradiction between the imported/imposed 
practice of the state and practices organizing political life according to another 
logic or rationality. The legitimacy crisis of the “imported” state in turn effects 
the international system. The international is therefore essential both for 
understanding political problems and for resolving them.1 2 “International 
Relations”, though of an unusual kind, take a central place in the study.
The following paper argues that IR can benefit from the work of a new- 
comer/outsider like Badie. Badie is concerned with one of the most central 
issues in the theoretical and methodological debates, namely the implications of 
cultural plurality for the theory and practice of IR. Rather than drawing on a 
philosophical and meta-theoretical discussions, he draws on comparative politics 
and owes more to anthropology than to philosophy, more to Geertz than to 
Derrida. This approach may enrich the discussion in IR and perhaps open up 
new fields of dialogue. This contention justifies including a scholar, evidently 
a novice in the field of IR proper, in this context.
Badie, who has produced both theoretical and applied work, is more than a
1 There is a bibliography at the end of the text. A cursory look reveals that Badie has 
written only one book (co-authored) and one article dealing with IR directly. The 
footnotes henceforth only mention the title of the publication referred to (titles in italics 
refer to books).
2 The possibility to imagine and develop alternative forms of political organization 




























































































theoretician interested in applied studies or an area specialist with some concern 
with theory. His method reflects a central theoretical proposition: that theories 
and concepts with claims to universal validity cannot be used to interpret social 
relations. The only way to understand political and social phenomena is to treat 
both history and culture seriously. The paper starts with a summary of the main 
theoretical claims, proceeds to discuss the treatment of one subject, the state, 
and finally show the relevance of Badie’s work to current 1R debates.
1. The Crisis of Universalism ?
The theoretical work of Badie is part of a scholarly trend that opposes social 
theories which analyse and explain social phenomena with concepts valid at all 
times and for all societies, claiming to know the ultimate direction of history, 
such as Marxism or Modernization Theory. Such theories, Badie argues, have 
been disproved as political science and sociology have expanded outside 
Western Europe.3 Time has also proved the inapplicability of overly general 
models. Developing countries have failed to follow prescribed paths. They have 
neither developed into images of Western democracies nor remained in the 
“periphery” of the World System. Therefore, Badie argues, the social sciences 
are undergoing a crisis which
stems from questioning universalism, mono-determinism and the compart- 
mentalism between political science and history. New paradigms are now 
conceived in order to overcome this crisis: culturalism, social action and 
historical sociology.4
This crisis manifests itself in what Badie calls the “three major crises of 
classical comparative analysis”: the crisis of universalism, that of space and that 
of time. In this section we will first pursue the arguments behind each crisis. 
Second, we will consider the use Badie makes of historical sociology to 
introduce the elements missing in a universalist analysis, namely history and 
culture, in a “historical sociology of culture”. Lastly, we will suggest that the 
development of this approach is still tentative and in many ways understandable 
only through Badie’s applied research.
3 “Formes et Transformations des Communautés Politiques”, p. 599.



























































































The expression of a crisis
Badie calls the first crisis the “crisis of universalism”. It is the crisis of mono- 
causal explanations. A caricature of monocausal explanation that Badie often 
uses as example is Robert Dahl’s claim early that GNP growth determines the 
development of democracy. In more subtle forms the use of mono-causal 
explanations in academia remains widespread. A main cause is sought out and 
given a central position in an explanatory framework granted general validity. 
Badie sees this as the most common procedure in political science.
This type of explanation assumes that there is a specific logic underlying a 
system where-ever and when-ever that system operates. However, Badie points 
out the factors most relevant for explanation change with the context. Since 
societies do not function in a single way, no single theory, with its gamut of 
concepts, methods and categories can adequately explain events. A theory 
developed in a context different from the one under analysis may obscure more 
than it clarifies.
In addition, implicit in most mono-causal explanations is the uni-directional 
assumption if A (differentiation, economic development, strong state) then B 
(development of a modern state, democratization, economic development), 
which disregards the evidence that similar events or developments might have 
not only varying but opposite effects in different contexts. In most cases it is 
the specific combination of construction of new structures and destruction of old 
ones which is important, so any deep-going sociological analysis must “account 
for the totality of evolutive and devolutive factors”, or, in other words, account 
not only for what develops but also for that which disappears.5
This first crisis leads a second crisis which Badie calls “crisis of explana­
tion”. Having posited that social science can no longer apply a universal 
framework, Badie explains this in terms of the plurality of rationalities, linked 
to the cultures within which they have evolved. On Weberian lines, Badie 
argues that since people’s motivations and behaviour are linked to their values, 
and their values, defined by culture, it is necessary to account for culture. 
Culture gives rise to variations in behaviour already among countries and 
regions in the Western world, but when we look beyond it, the significance of 
culture becomes even clearer. In this sense, the second crisis is a crisis of space 
provoked by the expansion of political science beyond the “West”, “pointing to 
the fact that political processes cannot be studied without reference to cultural
Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 3





























































































Finally, in addition to the difficulties caused by spatial expansion generaliz­
ing explanations are shaken by a third crisis, which Badie refers to as “a crisis 
affecting the relation to history”, or in other words a crisis related to time. Like 
culture, time changes the relevance of different variables. Historical change may 
invalidate a universal framework. The relevant factors for understanding “state­
building” in present-day developing countries are fundamentally different from 
those underlying the historical development of the states in Western Europe. 
Badie refutes the all too common teleological assumption that history is 
governed by “historical laws”. The “less developed” will not necessarily evolve 
into the “more developed”. On the contrary, respect for history entails 
recognizing that we have no means of knowing the future. What develops out 
of the present may not be a version of what already is, but something else. 
According to Badie there is, for instance, not one modernity towards which all 
countries evolve, but a plurality of modernities. Modernities in the Islamic 
world “defy all known models, by taking new forms which in no way repeat the 
history of the Western state-building.”7
To declare war on uni-causal mono-directional theories may strike one as 
flogging a dead horse. Systemic theories as well as reductionist and ahistorical 
forms of Marxism seem discredited and abandoned along with Grand Social 
Theory in most academic camps. Yet, in many subjects, including IR, concepts 
are blithely transferred from one cultural and historical context to another and 
theories applied to widely different realities as will be seen in greater detail 
below. This gives the criticism continued relevance.
The missing elements: history and culture
The causes underlying the crisis Badie discerns in the social sciences clearly 
indicate the elements which have to be introduced to resolve it: history and 
culture.
History is necessary to place social groups and institutions in their proper 
context. Standardized categories pave the way for misleading parallels and 
impedes understanding. Badie argues that relations between social groups have 
to be looked at in context. The past of these relations, with the concomitant 
institutionalisation and practice indicate the possible future development. It is, 
however, not enough to stress that concepts must be historically contextualized,
6 “Comparative Analysis in Political Science: Requiem or Résurrection?,” p. 343.



























































































a method to do so must also be developed. For this purpose Badie reverts to a 
specific brand of historical sociology.8
First, Badie argues that authors who use a general model to explain 
historical events, I. Wallerstein for instance, have made a valuable contribution 
by defining and refining abstract concepts in order to operationalize them. 
However, their efforts suffer from being based on a method designed to provide 
confirmation of an a priori theory. Since the model defines what the historian 
looks for it is almost inevitable that myopia will lead him to observe the causal 
relations posited by the model from the outset. There is little check on other 
possible causal factors. Moreover, there is an inbuilt inclination to select and 
interpret material to make it “fit” the categories defined by the theory.
Next Badie criticizes the approach of Skocpol and others, namely one 
“analyzing causal regularities in history” by comparing historical phenomena: 
e.g. social revolutions, democracy or dictatorship, or revolutions from above. 
This approach aims to identify common causes and structures underlying similar 
events. According to Badie this implies the assumption that the phenomena 
studied are essentially the same independently of the underlying cultural 
diversity. A revolution in China is presumed to be the same as a revolution in 
Russia, a claim Badie challenges.9
Badie favours a third type of historical sociology where “concepts are used 
to develop meaningful historical interpretation.”10 This approach is not direct 
to hypothesis testing, but uses sociological concepts to make sense of historical 
trajectories. Through detailed case studies it also spells out the embeddedness 
of the concepts used. Comparative studies are especially pertinent in this 
process since they bring out embeddedness more clearly than single cases. “The 
socio-historical identity of the modernity invented in the West,... is only fully 
perceptible when opposed to another political order, constructed in another 
context, and facing other challenges, which engenders a practice of politics of
Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 5
8 For an overview of the approaches Badie refers to, see Theda Skocpol, “Emerging 
Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical Sociology,” in her edited Vision and 
Methodology in Historical Sociology (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 
1982). The classification scheme is found on p. 363.
9 “Comparative Analysis in Political Science: Requiem or Resurrection?”, p. 350.
10 This tradition include Clifford Geertz, Islam Observed. Religious Development in 
Morocco and Indonesia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968); E. P. Thompson, The 
Making o f the English Working Class (New York: Vintage Books, 1966); Paul Starr, The 
Social Transformation o f American Medicine (New York: Basic Books, 1982); and 





























































































a different nature.”" However, comparison can only play this role if cases are 
more than illustrations of preconceived theories. In other words, while Skocpol 
argues in favour of a “variable-centred” approach Badie defends a “case- 
centred” approach.1 2
According to Badie, even this modest use of historical sociology is ridden 
with problems which the researcher can not resolve only reduce by critical 
awareness.13 The main problem, is that, as all historical approaches, it tends 
to overrate continuities and underestimate ruptures. In making sense of history, 
one is unwittingly led to accentuate cumulative events and conditions while 
underestimating the role of the arbitrary. The researcher is led back to the 
domain of linear causalities and falls back on evolutionary arguments. 
Moreover, historical presentation is inclined to produce the impression that 
events are unified in a “démarche totalisante”.'4 Badie follows Popper in 
warning about the risk inherent in summing up traits and events with possibly 
different causes and dynamics under a single heading and treating them as 
equivalent.
If introducing history appears problematic, introducing the second missing 
element, culture, is even more hazardous. Badie agrees with Weber that 
“political order is above all the outcome of conflicts between individuals and 
groups with diverging material interests and values”,15 and is therefore obliged 
to account for the divergence of values. But Weber himself, in Badie’s reading, 
remained caught in an evolutionary vision and “de facto provides the criteria for 
a political modernization”. Weber classified all societies that do not follow the 
Western pattern as non-rational and traditional.16 Badie underlines that such 
a classification is teleological, and that the binary categories rational-irrational, 
modern-traditional are inadequate tools for dealing with the empirical plurality 
of rationalities and political behaviour.
More sensitive concepts, defined in relation to the plurality of values must 
be developed.17 Values are an essential aspect of culture, for which Badie uses
11 ibid, p. 13.
12 The distinction is developed by Charles Ragin, The Comparative Method. Moving 
Beyond Qualitative and Quantitative Strategies (Berkeley et al.: University of California 
Press, 1987).
13 The following arguments are drawn from Culture et Politique, pp. 97-70.
14 ibid, p. 67.
15 “Formes et Transformations des Communautés Politiques”, p. 606.
16 ibid, pp. 606-07.



























































































Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 7
Geertz’s definition: culture is an “intersubjective system of meaning” which 
informs action.18 In other words, integrating culture in the study implies
revealing the cultural codes, that is the integrated systems of meaning, formed 
in history, and filling the function of controlling the processes of social and 
political transformation. Accounting for these codes should then allow us to 
define the content and the orientations of the different social objects which 
specify each significant social space.19
This being said, it is difficult to define cultural code exactly and to propose how 
it should be revealed. The twofold tradition for treating culture in political 
science—as Badie sees it—has provided little to build on. The most common 
attitude by far is to ignore culture altogether. Authors who have incorporated 
“culture” have usually done so (1) in a tautological way, or (2) as a residual 
category for explaining phenomena which cannot be accounted for by other 
means. The study of culture has been left to scholars in other disciplines, 
notably sociology and anthropology.20
To sum up, Badie argues that to meet the need for introducing both time and 
space in the analysis, it is necessary to develop a historical sociology of culture. 
However, there is little to build on. Authors in the tradition of historical 
sociology offer a well developed corpus regarding the use of history in 
sociology, yet contribute little to the study of culture. Those who have 
attempted to include culture—Skocpol, Barrington Moore, and Wallerstein 
ignore it—have usually reduced it in different ways. Perry Anderson reduces it 
to the legal system and particularly to the regulation of property rights; Bendix 
reduces culture to legitimacy and Stein Rokkan reduces it to religious 
institutions.21
18 Comparative Analysis in Political Science: Requiem or Resurrection?, for instance 
at p. 344.
19 Culture et Politique, p. 73.
20 It would be too complex to retrace the debate here. Stenographically, Badie draws 
on the semiotic approach in anthropology, and on a reading of Weber accentuating: 1. the 
role of structures in establishing culture; 2. the articulation of culture and other 
determinants of social and political action. See Culture et Politique, chapter I, for the 
anthropological heritage; chapter II, for treatment of Weber, Durkheim and Parsons, 
chapter III for the failure of political science to integrate culture. Also “Communauté, 
Individualisme et Culture,” pp. 119 ff. and “Formes et Transformations des Communautés 
Politiques,” pp. 608-21.




























































































Towards a historical sociology of culture
Bertrand Badie’s own approach is not entirely clear cut. He is more prone to 
point out the “weakness” of the enterprise than to define it and specify how 
studies of “the historical sociology of culture” should be pursued.22
He makes the point that there is no definition of political culture or the 
elements it can be apprehended. Second, the level o f analysis, viz. the limits of 
the community sharing a common political culture, is unclear. Should the limits 
be drawn according to nation, religion, language, tribe or clan? Third political 
culture is open and shifting. Outside influences and interventions constantly 
modify it, making it virtually impossible to pin down its meaning. Fourth, the 
status of political culture as an operational concept is ambiguous. It cannot be 
more than one variable whose relative weight will always be uncertain.23 
Finally, Badie deplores that there is no way of falsifying explanations in a 
historical sociology of culture.24
However, when we examine Badie’s project, these “weak” points appear to 
result from a misconstrued attempt to evaluate the research with a set of criteria 
belonging to a theory based on precisely the universal assumptions Badie is 
rejecting. Rather than shortcomings, the points Badie makes result from his 
project. How could there be a general definition of culture and how to approach 
it, if the aim of the study is precisely to “reveal the cultural codes, that is the 
integrated systems of meaning, formed in history, and filling the function of 
control on the processes of social and political transformation”? How could 
there be a clear definition of the relevant community to study, if concepts and 
categories (including community) are to be defined by the political culture to 
be studied? Finally, how could such a project be termed in a Popperian way, 
allowing it to be tested?
Consider how Badie proposes to study modernity: “political modernity, in 
what is its identity as well as in what has favoured or troubled its transfer [to 
areas outside the West], must be understood as a way of thinking politics, as a 
manner of accommodating [aménager] relations of domination and hence of
22 See notably, Culture et Politique, pp. 133 ff. and “Comparative Analysis in Political 
Science: Requiem or Resurrection?,” pp. 344 ff.
23 A classical statement of this point is made by Geertz in the comparison between 
Indonesia and Morocco and the different impact of Islamic culture in the two societies. 
See Geertz op. cit.



























































































Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 9
practising a political development, and finally as source of mobilisation 
contestataire.”25 Does not a project couched in terms of “thinking”, “managing 
relations of domination”, and “practising politics” sound like one suggested by 
those who refute methods which assume that a common exterior criterion can 
be used to test a theory?
It would seem that the major difficulty is the position on rationality and 
relativism, left out of the list of difficulties presented by Badie, as is the related 
question of how it is possible from the perspective of one culture to understand 
a foreign culture. How can the claims to plurality of value systems, of under­
standings of the self or the other, of modernities, and of rationalities coexist 
with the assumption of a single logic to account for them? In Badie’s work 
there is a continuous tension between the particular, the non-transferrable on the 
one hand, and the universal, the generalizable on the other. He emphasizes the 
need to develop universal concepts, to speak one language, and to study 
“Reality”, yet his studies are constructed around the claim that there are no 
generalizable explanations, that what has to be accounted for is the singular, 
that concepts change meaning in different contexts and cannot be transferred 
from one context to another, and that ultimately the rationalities change.26 The 
ambiguity is well expressed in the statement:
Rediscovering cultural plurality—and relativity— is a valuable acquisition in
recent critical sociology; however, to fall into the most absolute culturalism and
in the most total relativism can only lead to paradox.27
Badie gives no theoretical solution to this problem which is after all not surpris­
ing. However, Badie’s studies presuppose that it is possible to communicate 
between cultural codes. Through a process of studying and interacting with 
different cultural codes it is possible to understand them. This clearly requires 
applied studies.
2. Political Culture in Practice: the State
Since the theoretical claims made by Badie are inseparable from the analysis of 
historical phenomena a reference to it is important both to reflect its position
25 Les Deux Etats. Pouvoir et Société en Occident et en terre d ’Islam, p. 15.
26 Comparative Analysis in Political Science: Requiem or Résurrection?, p. 351.




























































































in the work and to clarify theoretical points. This section will therefore 
concentrate at the applied study of “historical sociology of culture”. We have 
seen that Badie defines culture as an intersubjective system of meaning (Geertz’ 
definition). Political culture then becomes the intersubjective system of meaning 
underlying politics. It might further be recollected that modernity (a form of 
political culture) is defined,
...as a way of thinking politics, as a manner of accommodating relations of 
domination and hence of practising a political development, and finally as source 
of mobilisation contestataire.2#
These three interwoven elements (thinking, practising, and managing change), 
will be taken as the components of “political culture”. We will show how these 
three elements of political culture are used to explain state-building in different 
contexts.28 9 First, “practising politics” will be discussed mainly with regard to 
Europe through the work La Sociologie de l ’Etat. The different European 
trajectories of state development underlines that political culture is formed by 
practice and cannot be deduced from any single aspect (such as religion). The 
second aspect of political culture, “thinking politics”, will be discussed through 
Badie’s comparison of state building in the West (here treated as a unity) and 
in the Islamic world in Les Deux Etats. The difference in “thinking politics” 
clarifies some fundamental differences in political culture. The “management 
change”, the last component of political culture, will be dealt with through 
L ’Etat Importé. It shows that political culture is perpetuated via change. The 
generalization of the state outside Western Europe masks considerable 
continuity in political culture. The problems caused by “importing” state 
practices brought Badie to take a more active interest in IR.
The Western state: practising politics
Badie and Pierre Birnbaum consider that the duality of the secular and the 
religious is common to Western European political thinking. The church and the 
princes opposed each other “precisely on the grounds of a duality of categories 
which all the actors accept, recognize a priori”.30 This, according to Badie, 
remains the case throughout the history of Christianity, including the Absolutist
28 Les Deux Etats. Pouvoir et Société en Occident et en terre d ’Islam, p. 15.
29 Ail aspects of political culture could have been presented in any of the works. The 
following division is purely a matter of including Badie’s key works.



























































































period and the Reformation.31 Since duality is shared, variations in political 
culture cannot be explained by religion alone. Instead political practice seems 
significant. For instance, the link between feudalism and the establishment of 
strong central state (absolutism) is confirmed by Badie and Birnbaum.32 But 
since feudalism took different forms across Europe, the states that emerged were 
correspondingly diverse. The initial trajectories become self-reinforcing and 
survive the cultural and historical context of their origin.33
Some of Badie’s arguments with regard to France and in the UK can serve 
as illustrations. In France, where national unification was slow and allegiance 
to the centre long remained weak, the state centralized for control and 
centralization eventually perpetuated itself (pp. 173-88). The first European 
army was French; from 1551 the king began to send out fonctionnaires, with 
powers overriding those of local officers; Richelieu systematically destroyed 
local fortifications; the revolutionary national assembly established 83 
départements to undo regional communities; Napoleon definitely put the 
administration outside the realm of the common law; minds and education were 
increasingly controlled from the centre; and economic life was subjected to the 
control of the state through mercantilism and nationalisation. The effect of 
centralization and extensive intervention was the formation of a bureaucracy and 
the formation of what Toqueville considered to be "une classe particulière” of 
“fonctionnaires administratifs”.
The result is a particularly original relation between the categories of rulers. To 
the extent that the state, as organization, has made itself independent of the 
ruling class and of the entire civil society, it seems to monopolize the representa­
tive function of which Parliament is consequently deprived (p. 187).
In Britain, on the contrary, the state developed through and reinforced 
relations of collaboration between the political centre and the periphery (pp. 
196-203). Allegiance to the political centre was achieved early. The elites in 
Britain coexisted with the centre and the centre did not centralize to control. 
Instead of sending out emissaries to break up regional solidarities, it relied on
Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 11
51 See Sociologie de l ’Etat, pp, 145-148, and Culture et Politique, pp. 117 for the 
point on absolutism and pp. 118-139 for a discussion of protestantism.
32 The feudal order creates social class solidarities among peasants and serfs, opposed 
to the feudal lord. Moreover, it cuts the city and the country-side off from each other, 
making possible in the long run an alliance between the crown and the city.





























































































the services of locals. Moreover, the borders of Great-Britain are more obvious 
than those of the continental countries. There was no reason to develop a strong 
army. Rather the navy developed as much for conquering external markets as 
for military defense. “In Great-Britain, it is the market that dominates and not 
the state, whereas in France or in Prussia the state organizes the market.” The 
outcome was a weak state with a low level of institutionalization. The civil 
service developed late, and was kept apart from actual political power. In 
Britain the civil servants constitute an “almost totally marginalized governing 
category.” The situation is one where,
Instead of a state, it is a social class that governs Great-Britain, an establishment
to which the middle classes and the local gentry are linked and which includes
the aristocracy... as well as the bourgeoisie (p. 199).
In short, Badie argues that variation in historical practice in Europe has 
produced a range of political cultures. Consequently, in spite of a common 
religion, and a common way of understanding the world, the European countries 
have developed different forms of states and diverging political cultures. 
“Western political modernity derives its identity and its singularity from its 
relation to a historical context and shared enjeux (stakes), and above all from 
a common culture... Western political modernity ceases to be singular when it 
is analyzed in terms of concrete challenges represented by the construction of 
each of the European systems.”34
The state in the “land of Islam”: thinking politics
The second element of political culture, thinking about politics, comes to the 
fore in Badie’s comparison of the Islamic world and in the West. A fundamen­
tal difference between state-building in the Islamic world and in the West, is 
that they take place in contexts marked by fundamentally different or even 
opposite ways of understanding politics.35 This does not presuppose an 
immutable “Muslim” way of thinking politics. New practices and ideas are 
constantly integrated and old ones transformed. However, they are combined 
with the preexisting political culture which persists, albeit in altered form.
14 Les Deux Etats. Pouvoir et Société en Occident et en terre d ’Islam, p. 13.
15 This is evidently not the only difference. There are also differences in the social 
structures, in the impact of the international system, and in the way that these and other 
factors fed into a way of practising and managing politics. However, the following 



























































































Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 13
According to Badie, politics in Islamic political “thought” is diametrically 
opposed to Western political thinking: the duality between temporal and 
spiritual is even more radically rejected than is commonly accepted. It is usually 
argued that early Islamic political thinking was tainted by “Islamic” and 
“Hellenistic” traditions. According to Badie this thesis misinterprets the meaning 
of the hellenistic imports and exaggerates the tensions they caused. In fact, 
Muslim political thinkers adjusted the Hellenic concepts and theories to their 
own frame.
It was mainly Plato’s fundamentally monist and communitarian ideas that 
the Arab thinkers used, as opposed to Aristotle introduced in the West by 
Thomas of Aquino. Moreover, the parts of Plato which would have required a 
revision of the Islamic position on the unity of temporal and spiritual were 
transformed. For instance, the Platonian concept of nomos (ideal), to which laws 
should conform to be just, was assimilated to the shari ’a.36 Likewise, Farabi 
justifies separating ideal and legitimate policies (revealed) from the real and 
imperfect (human) ones by using Plato. Even in the hellenistic version of 
Muslim political philosophy, Badie argues, human reason can be no more than 
instrumental in revealing the superiority of the divine law. The ignorant polity 
(not of reason but of the divine revelations—djdhiliyya) remains the rejectable 
polity.The search for the revealed truth and not for rationality, explains the 
effort put into education and political persuasion by the falasifa, as in the work 
of Naser ed-Din Tusi.
the Islamic scholastic of the kalam is founded on the double proposition that 
reason cannot be a substitute for the revealed truth and cannot consist in 
anything but a method of gaining access to this truth.37
The “Hellenism” of the falasifa, remained essentially Islamic, in accepting 
the unity of the spiritual and the temporal. The unity of the religious and the 
political gives fundamental political concepts a new meaning. Unlike its 
Western counterpart, Islamic political theory makes a sharp distinction between 
power as authority and power as puissance. Whereas the former is in the hands
36 Since the nomos is equated with the Shari’a, the prevailing presentation of Ibn 
Rushd (Averroes) as the defender of the duality of truth is false according to Badie, ibid, 
pp. 43-55.
37 ibid, p. 49. There are different interpretations of what this method entails. 
According to the motazilist school of the VIII"' Century, the Koran should be interpreted 




























































































of God, the latter is the empirically observable human power, necessary to 
maintain social order. The first is tied to legitimacy, the second to necessity. In 
this context legitimacy can never be constructed around human reason, but is 
religiously derived.
Current Vision of Modernity Main Exponents
Reform­
ists
the compatibility of Islam and Moderni­
ty, the only sign of rupture is in the 
acceptance of nation state defined in 
terms of continuity
Rifa’a Rafi’ al-Tahtawi, Ibn 
Abi Diaf, Khayer-ad-Din, 




the need to return to the sources and 
find the roots of an alternative moderni­
ty, and alternative political forms. Islam 
is accepted not only as religion but as 
civilization.
Djamal-ad-Din al-Afghani. 
Muhamad (Abduh, Rashid 
Rida, Ahmad Khan Bah­
adur
Islamists same as revivalists, but in addition there 
is an the radical incompatibility between 
Islam and Western modernity, imputing 
the responsibility of failed modernity to 
this incompatibility
Hasan al-Banna, *Abd al- 






Secular, modernity based on the nation 
state to be imported from the West
Shibli Shumayyil, Farah 
Antun, Michel Aflak, Sala- 
mah Musa
Table 1. Modernity Viewed by Contemporary Thinkers from the Muslim World
Political thinking in pre-dominantly muslim countires continues to reflect the 
unity of temporal and spiritual. First, the political debate around modernity and 
the effects of importing the state and political practices from the West has 
continuously been posed in terms of its compatibility with the Muslim religion 
(table 1). Second, the importance of religious movements in politics indicates 
continuity. They are often at the origin of the political opposition since they, 
more than other movements, are able to challenge the legitimacy of the regime 
by claiming to know “the right” interpretation of the revelation. But also 
because they are difficult to repress and can only be controlled at the risk of 
eroding legitimacy. Inversely, the limited role of non-religious radical political 
movements, notably Marxism, mirrors a lack of legitimacy sharpened by the 



























































































Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 15
in Lebanon).
Badie summarises the continuity in political thinking in his idea of culture 
de l ’émeute, as opposed to the culture citoyenne of the West. In the Muslim 
world, “political dialogue” is inconceivable. Political opposition is directed 
against the political scene as such, whereas in the West demands for political 
change aim specific policies. Typically, opposition is expressed in abrupt riots. 
Political opposition explodes as the community (not the individual) considers 
the political power holder illegitimate. A decision is not reasoned because of the 
religious definition of legitimacy. Badie would not claim that thinking about 
politics alone could explain the culture de l ’émeute. Differences in political 
practice are equally significant. The strong vertical solidarities (family, ethnicity, 
regions, etc.) in most Muslim countries weaken the role of horizontal solida­
rities, diminishing the potential role of trade unions and political parties in 























































Table 2. Contemporary Political Regimes’ Handling of the Culture de I’Emeule
Governments live with the culture de l ’émeute by developing ways of 
controlling the political periphery. Because of the radicalness of political oppos­
ition, they try to contain it combining repression, neo-patrimonial and 




























































































sees that negotiated political change is blocked (table 2).
In short, Islamic political thought, notably the crucial lack of separation 
between religious and temporal, leads to a perception of essential aspects of 
political life, including community, individuality, legitimacy, sovereignty or 
property sharing nothing of similar concepts in the West. This modifies political 
actors’ understanding of themselves and others. Methodologically this means 
that to make sense of politics in the muslim work entails some form of 
understanding of Islamic political thought. Moreover, the political thinking 
prevalent in the Muslim world is one of the main factors in the creation of a 
political culture of riot, as opposed to the European culture of citizenship. 
Because of this political culture many governments in Muslim countries are 
trapped in vicious circles: distance from the political periphery makes rulers, 
weary of radical political opposition, try to control the periphery through a set 
of clientelistic and repressive relations. This blocks democratic change and 
radicalizes an opposition with a conception of legitimacy already pushing it to 
question the regime, which reinforces the need to control the periphery, the 
reliance on clientelistic relations, and perpetuates the strong vertical solidarities.
The “imported state”: managing change
The vicious circle identified in the states of the Islamic World has a direct 
bearing on the third component of political culture: the management of change. 
The handling of change influences not only the prevailing political culture, but 
also sets the stage for possible future transformations. In The Imported State, 
Badie generalizes insights and conclusions from the studies of the state in 
Muslim world to other non-Western who share an imported political practice, 
imported ideologies, imported institutional roles for political parties and for the 
administration.38 Their legal systems are expected to resolve conflicts in a 
society for which they were not designed, and over which the laws usually have 
little or no grip.
The reality is that, interiorised as it may be by local elites, the state model does
not function and merely reproduces itself formally in the societies of the third
world [...] the state in Africa as in Asia remains a pure product of importation,
18 Imported, refers to the “transfer to a given society, of a social, political or 
economic model or a practice, generated and invented in a history and social order which 
are fundamentally different from its own”. L ’Etat Importé. Essai sur l ’Occidentalisation 



























































































Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 17
a pale copy of the European political and social systems, a heavy, inefficient 
foreign body and a source of violence.”
A threefold logic underlies the importing of the Western state model:
First, an interactive logic of dependency spurs imports.40 By dependency, 
Badie means a system where the leaders of the South are dependent economi­
cally, but also technologically, and symbolically, on the interaction with “patron 
states”. Even states defining their identity by refusing the “West” (India, Libya), 
remain tributary to this West for their political system as well as their negative 
identity. Dependency is expressed in “sovereignty appropriations [captations de 
souveraineté].”41 Diplomatic, socio-economic and institutional activities of 
client states are taken over by the patrons to a certain extent. However, the 
clearest expression of dependency is the lack of (institutional, ideological, 
technological, symbolic or economic) alternatives.
Second, the Western state is imported and maintained because of its 
universalist pretensions. In the Western intellectual tradition, the state is 
presented as the outcome of the spread of knowledge and reason. The warnings 
of classical thinkers, including Weber and Durkheim, that the state is rooted in 
a specific culture and might not be transferrable have been constantly forgotten 
and ignored. Instead, political development is equated with the adoption of this 
model. The “hegemony of Western modernity” further spreads with the “West­
ernization of the international scene” through (1) the “territorialization of the 
world” dividing it according to state borders.42 (2) The imposition of principles 
developed in the West through international law (pp. 102 ff). International 
treaties have mushroomed and respect of these treaties is more often imposed 
on the weaker countries. (3) The Westernization of the international scene is 
linked to the “rules of the international game” (pp. 110 ff). Since the treaties of 
Westphalia, the state is expected to monopolize international violence. The 
international system rests on the “fiction of sovereignty”.
Lastly, the Western state is imported because a “class o f importers”, a state 
elite (bureaucratic or intellectual) make it part of their strategies. These 
strategies are partially a matter of choice. Rulers have often adopted foreign 
techniques to strengthen themselves against external (Ottoman Empire, Turkish
”  Sociologie de l ’Etat, p. 163.
40 L ’Etat Importé. Essai sur l ’Occidentalisation de l ’Ordre Politique, p. 36.
41 Les Deux Etats. Pouvoir et Société en Occident et en terre d ’Islam, pp. 55 ff.
42 L ’Etat Importé. Essai sur l ’Occidentalisation de l'Ordre Politique, pp. 82 ff. The 




























































































Republic) or internal threats (Meji Japan). Likewise, revolutionary leaders use 
imported political practices and ideologies to distance themselves from the West 
(Indonesia’s or Zimbabwe’s use of socialism). However, imports are also 
involuntary. Policies pursued often have unintended consequences. The 
development of an army and the concomitant need for financial and technical 
aid involve compliance to conditions not initially in the minds of importers. The 
introduction of clocks in the Ottoman Empire, contested by an ulema consider­
ing that clocks threatened their authority, was for instance a by-product of the 
efforts to modernize the army technologically. Moreover, policies may have 
composition effects. The Atatiirk’s modernization policies implied measures that 
polarized the army against the religious establishment, initially allies, eventually 
led to the abolition of the caliphate (1926).
The logic that leads to adopting the state indicates the problems in managing 
the ensuing change. The dependency on the West, the difficulties in escaping 
the universalistic pretensions of the state, and the inclusion of imports in elite 
strategies, hinder the development of real alternatives. As the political centre 
increasingly relies on and lives in an imported political culture, it cuts itself off 
from the more traditional sections of society. A vicious circle similar to that 
observed in the Muslim world is formed. Governments pay off various groups 
and wind up in a neo-patrimonial logic which blocks democratic change. The 
prevalence of this vicious circle is most visibly expressed in the absence of civil 
societies based on a public/private division of spheres, an individualization of 
social relations, citizenship, horizontal solidarities, and the spread of associ­
ations (p. 116-8). The more or less authoritarian attempts to emulate a 
controllable civil society through corporatist strategies or personal “father of the 
nation” incitements invariably fail. Political protests, consequently, direct 
themselves against the political system as such rather than against specific 
policies or individuals. “Internal disorder” becomes a logical outcome of the 
failure to universalize the state. The problems of the Islamic state no longer 
appear isolated, related to a specific way of thinking about politics, but as the 
outcome of the more general difficulties of managing political change.
The difficulty of coming to terms with change influences the international 
as well as the internal order. Discontent is rarely contained in a national sphere. 
Movements of protest are typically rooted in solidarities rejecting the “national 
community” as the adequate space of political dissent. Religious and ethnic 
movements have no reason to stop at national borders. On the contrary, media 
has been a formidable promoter cross-border solidarities. The international 



























































































Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 19
of the international order as such. Protests are directed against international 
borders (Iran-Iraq war) or crystallised around international objects (oil in the 
Aegean) or issues (Rushdie affair). There is a return to the point of departure. 
The international order may spread the state practice, but the difficulties it 
provokes in turn affect the international order.
Badie’s imported state underlines that the fate of nations and, more 
importantly, the destiny of people within their boundaries, are inseparable from 
the international system. Globalization makes the original culture and the 
“happy savage” illusionary. Globalization will probably not give a truce to 
countries who need to solve their political problems. Since the difficulties posed 
by the imported state cannot be considered or resolved on a purely national 
level, the international system is of immediate concern. Moreover, the 
international system is becoming increasingly affected by the legitimacy crises 
of states outside the West. Civil wars, disputes over state boundaries and 
increasingly militant rejection of the West appear as chief causes for interna­
tional “disorders” at present.43 It therefore becomes logical to pay closer 
attention to international developments and their effects.
3. Bertrand Badie and the Debates in International Relations
The opening lines in Le Retournement du Monde state that the international 
system is the most unstable of all political systems, and that the crisis of the 
nation state though not in itself sufficient to explain this instability, is a link 
connecting many issues.44 From the outset the crisis of universalism at the 
level of the nation state is directly tied to the international level. Indeed, the 
retournement (reversal) of both the conventional world order and of the tools 
for analyzing it, is the conclusion of Badie’s earlier work on the plurality of the 
state and on the non-transferability of concepts across cultural borders.
In this section we will first examine the reasons for which Badie and Smouts 
argue that the plurality of actors and of frames of reference make it impossible 
to stick with the conventional conceptions of national and international politics. 
Then we will place their arguments in the French tradition of studying IR.
43 The growing interest taken in “civilizational clashes”, as for instance in the recent 
works of Huntington (in Foreign Affairs) and of Galtung (just to mention two giants) 
seem to confirm this.
44 Le Retournement du Monde. Sociologie de la Scène Internationale, p. 11. The 




























































































Although the work of Badie suits the French habit of subsuming IR under other 
subjects, his studies tie up with more institutionalised French IR, and notably 
the work of Raymond Aron. However, Badie differs from Aron by rejecting a 
higher level theory for the international system. This brings us to the debates 
in general IR theory, where Badie sides with “critical” or “reflectivist” writers 
in the current (international) IR debate, where his work can be seen as a fresh 
contribution.
The reversal of International Relations
The present international system is the reverse of what it is commonly presented 
to be. This is Badie’s and Marie-Claude Smouts central claim. The international 
system, can not be seen as resting on a triad organizing politics, space and 
motives: sovereignty, territoriality and security. It
is more diffuse in terms of power and more dispersed in terms of action, it 
emancipates individuals and groups but restricts sovereignty, liberates 
particularism and impedes institutionalization (p. 241).
To account for this new order, or increased disorder, the authors argue that it 
is necessary to step outside the conventional boundaries of IR theory and to 
draw on the “new horizons which the progress in sociology, in comparative 
politics and in the study of transnational flows offer” (p. 19). However, the 
work remain allusive on what these should bring. This may be explained by the 
limited ambitions of the book which is “less than a work of theory but more 
than a simple introduction, aiming to give a fil conducteur through the labyrinth 
of events and approaches” (p. 11) in IR. Three issues dominate the book: (1) 
the proliferation of international actors, (2) the impossibility to disregard the 
effects of an interaction of a plurality of rationalities, and (3) the ensuing need 
for a revision of traditional IR concepts based on a single rationality.
I . A plurality o f actors
The claim that the state is no longer the only, or even the central, actor in IR 
remains controversial. However, the idea that states have little in common but 
the denomination, is likely to be even more contentious in a subject which has 
conventionally rested on the assumption that states are equal in principle.
Reversing the customary explanation of problems with sovereignty as caused 



























































































Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 21
the state as one of the factors fuelling the development of transnational 
flows.45 The legitimacy deficit of imported states fuels alternative, often infra­
national and supra-national, solidarities and legitimacy forms, that by definition 
disregard the limits of the state. Further, the uncertainty of the nature of the 
state, augmented by the transformation of states (the end of empire), gives free 
reins to new nationalist and particularist claims (as in the former USSR). The 
increase in internationally articulated religious and ethnic claims can be seen in 
this perspective. In a more conventional vein, Badie and Smouts join the chorus 
of voices in IR and political science pointing to the effect of transnational flows 
on political order and the legitimacy of states. The identity of the state is 
directly affected by the large number of transnational flows. The central role of 
the state as provider of security, the sovereign, and upholder of order on its 
territory is constantly threatened as non-state actors take over part of these 
functions or contest the right of the state to keep them.
The plurality of non-state actors marks the “revenge of the real and concrete 
societies on a state order which after all remains rather abstract” (p. 70). New 
international actors emerge challenging the rather artificially constituted state. 
This “handicaps” the state’s ability to act because it cannot master flows more 
stable and more perennial linked to “long conjunctures, to ties variables 
lourdes,”46 The result is an anomie in state policies confronted with interna­
tional protests (non-governmental organizations) and violence (terrorism) that 
the state has no means to control. Conventional diplomatic techniques prove 
ineffective as the conflictual relations transcend the inter-state realm (p. 110).
2. A plurality o f rationalities (p. 24)
The plurality of actors leads to a plurality of rationalities interacting in the 
international system. Each new actor, emerging on the international scene, has 
a political culture of its own, and its own perception of the identity of self and 
other, of past and present. To the extent that this perception motivates 
(international) action, it excludes the possibility that a universal system or
45 by which the authors mean all relations beyond the frame of the state escaping at 
least partially the control of the state, i.e. including the actions of religious institutions, 
the development of international media and culture, and economic flows (see chapter 2).
46 This is a concept in French IR attached mainly to the work of Pierre Renouvin and 
J.B. Duroselle. These are underlying the forces profondes which Smouts defines as "basic 
evolutionary forces at the root of understanding world development". SMOUTS, Marie- 




























































































theory could account for the international system.
This is not only significant for the many new areas of transnational 
interaction, as has been implied by many students of 1R, Badie and Smouts 
argue that it also fundamentally alters the outlook on traditional issues in IR. 
For instance, accepting of the idea that states are not the same and that they 
follow differently defined rationalities, means that strategic thinking has to be 
revised. The effects of plural rationalities is strongest outside the conventional 
diplomatic sphere. Conflicts escape the control of the state. They take place 
between states with different political cultures, but also between entities which 
do not share in or explicitly refuse state. Armed conflict often involves 
movements that either contest the state (civil wars) or simply ignore it 
(organized crime). Diplomacy looses its effectiveness as it has to deal with 
movements outside the beaten path, that follow different rules or explicitly 
reject the diplomatic rules. “Already largely utopian in the old inter-state 
system, the regulation of war and the pacific settlement of conflicts has 
disappeared with the privatization of violence” (p. 184).
Badie and Smouts recognize that there is a conventional sphere of interstate 
action managed by diplomats sharing a diplomatic culture. A la James Rosenau 
they therefore separate the sphere of state craft from a sphere of transnational 
relations. While the state sphere is stable and functions according to an 
international diplomatic culture, non-state relations are unstable and follow no 
predetermined, or rather a myriad of, logic(s) and culture(s). “Thus, the 
sociology of IR is constantly confronted with a duality of codes: for the 
necessities of international exchanges, a universal code apparently constructed 
around the notion of sovereignty; for the deep forces [forces profondes], a 
multiplicity of repertories, of which it is impossible to know which one will be 
used” (p. 145-6).
In these conditions it is difficult to establish norms and rules for most 
international action. There can be no question of a rule arrived at by consensus 
of all the international actors. This does not exclude that rules and norms 
govern behaviour in certain spheres of international life. However, these cannot 
in any sense be conceived as permanent consensus or rationality based. 
International rules and norms are reinterpreted and contested at all times. There 
is a constant disregard of the “rules of the game” by those who deny their 
validity.
3. “The revenge o f the actor on the system” (p. 240)



























































































Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 23
increased complexity of the relations is that the actor has to be granted a more 
central place in the analysis. It is necessary to find a way of accounting for the 
multiple rationalities, for the multiplicity of identities, cultures, and motives 
interacting internationally. To ignore them would be disastrous both for the 
attempt to gain an understanding of international phenomena and of course for 
any practical translation of this into political practice. “In general, by reducing 
the other to the self, the actor looses all rationality, yet believes herself to be 
acting in the name of a universal rationality” (p. 28). However, integrating the 
multiplicity of rationalities present in the second “code” of the “forces 
profondes”, is more easily said than done. The authors hint at the need to revise 
the central concepts of IR, viz. Badie’s exhortations to abandon universalizing 
approaches and introduce historically and culturally sensitive studies. They 
argue that IR has been particularly resistant to change:
Since it cannot function on all these levels, the theory of IR has a tendency to 
privilege that of universality, campant en fait sur les terrains balisés par 
l'historié et la philosophie européennes from which it draws its main arguments.
The academic divide between internationalists and specialists of 'exotic’ political 
systems reinforce this withdrawal [of IR] by impeding the necessary fécondation 
mutuelle (p. 146).
Badie and Smouts join other IR scholars in deploring the insufficiency of the 
instruments at the disposal of the analyst for studying an increasingly complex 
reality. The concept of power for instance, is increasingly elusive and appears 
to vary with the perception one has of it (p. 146). Moreover, conventional 
systemic analysis appears unable to define the system, its functioning and the 
rules of change (p. 156).
However, and perhaps this is what could be expected, Badie and Smouts 
propose no alternative theory of IR If any actor has multiple identities with 
reference to different, not necessarily compatible, and dynamic cultural contexts 
and if the choice of how to define the self, at any particular moment in time, 
is the outcome of a complex strategy, there can be no general theory. “The 
extreme diversity of internal political orders makes the identification and the 
number of the actors of the international system very uncertain; it also makes 
it impossible to reduce to any single paradigm the articulation between the 
internal and the external order” (p. 29 my italics47). Badie also argues that, 
for understanding change in IR, the concept of structure is only an obstacle.




























































































There is no such thing as an international structure. A structure can be nothing 
more than a the culturally embedded network of the actors.48 Instead, the 
authors suggest accounting for diversity by taking the actor as point of 
departure.
The ’self’ and the ’other’ is no longer a philosophical question or a problem of 
foreign relations taken on by the state. Foreign policy is made daily and implies 
each individual”(p. 243).
Français malgré lui ?
How does this way of treating IR relate to a would-be French tradition? It is 
difficult to say if such a traditions exists in the first place, as most debates take 
place cross-nationally, if not transnationally. Unlike the Brits, who claim to 
have “the only fully fledged non-American tradition of IR scholarship”49, IR 
in France is mostly denied a strong place. This makes it easy to underestimate 
the scope if IR studies in France. “IR” is scarcely used.50 Smouts remarks that 
French IR has been slow to develop because of the tendency to subsume IR 
studies under other subjects. Yet, a rich literature pertinent to IR exists in 
France.51 Badie’s work can be linked both to the tendency of the French to 
subsume IR under other subjects and to the institutionalised French IR tradition.
On the one hand, Badie clearly considers IR as part of political science. He 
has approached the subject by way of political science and continues to refer 
mainly to debates in political science, rather than to debates in IR. This leads 
to some stunning omissions of IR literature. The relative absence of the “British 
school” of IR is one, which is all the more striking as the themes of the spread 
of the system of states and the effects of cultural plurality and multiple loyalties
48 Interview, 30 June 1993.
49 Neumann’s paper presented on this panel.
50 There are however, well institutionalized schools for historic and strategic studies. 
For the strategic studies in France, see journals such as Défense Nationale or Mélanges 
Stratégiques and in the publications of the IFRI (Institut Français de Relations 
Internationales) and the CERI (Centre d ’Etudes des Relations Internationales). For the 
historic school one school is that created by R. Aron which will be discussed below and 
another one related to the works of Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle, Introduc­
tion à l ’Histoire des Relations Internationale (Paris: A. Colin, 1964). Jean-Baptiste 
Duroselle, Histoire Diplomatique de 1919 à Nos Jours (Paris: Dalloz, 1978).
51 Smouts, op. cit. This ambiguous wording is the only possible explanation for the 
British claim to have the only school of IR outside the US. For other national traditions 



























































































Bertrand Badie: Cultural Diversity Changing International Relations ? 25
on the international system are central to this tradition. Moreover, the British 
school of IR tackles the themes from an angle which Badie should find it easy 
to sympathise with.52 There are other omissions due rather to the French 
academic climate. Feminism and gender studies, for instance, is not even 
considered worthy of a mention in the sociology of IR despite the focus on 
identities constituted outside the framework of the nation state and on cross 
national solidarities and movements.53 Likewise, the “post-structuralists” are 
dismissed with one sentence: “This picture is not a “deconstruction” of the 
world by authors caught in a fashionable post-structuralism” (p. 237). A 
disconcerting dismissal, for Badie and Smouts share many insights, premises, 
and conclusions of the brushed-aside post-structuralists.
On the other hand, Badie has clear links to part of the institutionalised 
academic IR tradition in France. The “sociological approach”, as defined by 
Marcel Merle, or the sociological part of the four level conceptualization of IR 
proposed by Raymond Aron (theory, sociology, history and praxology), lie close 
to Badie’s work, not only in terms of the titles of the books.54
These studies share the characteristic of being the work of “outsiders”. Aron 
immigrated to IR from sociology and Merle, a lawyer, from (mainly) Anglo- 
American systemic thinking. Badie is also a foreigner in the French IR 
community (in addition to being half Iranian by nationality). Much of his work 
has mixed and imported debates and literature, although as Badie would point 
out, imports always entail changes and adaptions. The works on “culture and 
politics” and on “cultural development” are overviews of classical “interna­
tional” literature on the subject. Likewise, the concern with the Islamic state and 
the studies of the different rationalities that underlie the development of the 
state in the West and in the “land of Islam”, have led Badie to use “Orientalist 
literature” regarding Islamic political thought which has rarely been applied to 
the discussion around state-building. Badie has worked as a developer of 
debates and introducer or ideas, rather than as a carrier of a national tradition.
A considerable distance, nonetheless, separates Badie’s work from that of
52 The work of Hedley Bull is referred to, but the work of authors such as Andrew 
Linklater, Martin Wight or James Mayall are unfortunately not discussed.
53 Such neglect is improbable in the Anglo-Saxon academic community where gender 
studies have come to occupy a central place. See the overview by V. Spike Peterson and 
Anne Sisson Runyan (eds), Global Gender Issues (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993). Or 
the special issue in Millennium vol. 17 n. 3 (1988).
54 See Marcel Merle, Sociologie des Relations Internationales (Paris: Dalloz, 1982); 




























































































other French IR scholars. Merle develops a strictly systemic approach, explicitly 
declining provide to an account of the international system or to answer 
immediate questions. Rather Merle’s aim is to analyse of “the substance of 
IR”55, a substance Badie would not doubt deny the existence of.
The relation to Aron’s work is more complicated. On the one hand, much 
of the criticism advanced by Badie and Smouts with regard to the traditions of 
IR can be found also in Aron’s work. Aron would have no difficulty in 
recognizing the importance of non-state actors and transnational phenomena, 
which he treats extensively. “Never until present has a civilization been in 
contact with so many other civilizations; never has a civilization conquered so 
many lands, unsettled so many customs or transferred so much knowledge and 
power to men that were defeated, subjugated and exploited by it.”56 57Nor would 
it be difficult for Aron to recognize the themes of the multitude of states or the 
diversity of the meaning of the state. Indeed, he explicitly considers the state 
as a specific construction of Western European history, which, when transposed 
differs in both form and substance, though juridically remaining the same. Aron 
also discusses the particular problems of the Muslim states with regard to a 
secular political order. Finally, Aron would agree that IR is part and parcel of 
an extended political science family.
A total science or philosophy of politics would include international relations as 
one of its chapters, but this chapter would keep its originality because it would 
treat the relations between political units each o f which claims the right o f 
implementing its own justice [se faire justice elle-même I and o f being the sole 
master o f the decision to fight or not to fight.51
On the other hand, Badie and Smouts fundamentally differ from Aron on the 
question of rationality. For Aron, the objective of the sociologist is to formulate 
general propositions, either in terms of the determinants of the elements 
constitutive of the international order, or in terms of their regularities in the 
succession of international orders.58 The sociologist’s function is to context­
ualize an element of the theory. This presupposes that theory is not itself a 
matter of contextuality and history, as Badie would argue that it is. The 
heterogeneity of the system is assumed not to affect its fundamental functioning.
55 ibid, p. 5.
56 Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations, p. 325.
57 Raymond Aron, Paix et guerre entre les nations, p. 20. Original emphasis.
58 ibid, 184. That Aron is referring to the idea of a universal logic is clear in the 
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Thus, Aron can observe civilizational clashes (p. 325); differences in the 
meaning of states (p. 375-7) and argue that the neutrality of the state is 
inconceivable for many people (p. 375), or that development and institutions are 
not transferrable (p. 378), without considering that this influences the 
“theoretical level”.
Badie and Smouts draw the opposite conclusion. They argue that the multi­
plicity of meaning changes the fundamental categories of IR and thus alters the 
logic of the system as such. Since the concepts of sovereignty or state—at the 
heart of IR—are not of universal validity, it is impossible to carry out an 
analysis of IR based on these concepts. In brief, no “specificity of the 
international system” exists to make it possible to proceed at Aron’s higher 
level (or at least any such specificity has yet to be identified). The role of the 
“sociology of IR” then becomes to make conceptual sense of individual 
development trajectories while simultaneously redefining concepts in relation 
to these same trajectories, rather than to find generalities or to contextualize a 
universally applicable logic.
In the camp of the challengers
At this point Badie enters the current debate in IR. By asking how an interna­
tional system operates, in which actors follow different rationalities, have 
different perceptions of the world and of their own actions and the actions of 
others, Badie finds himself in the camp of writers questioning the mainstream.
In fact, there seems to be an ongoing, or never ending, crisis in the 
discipline of IR and more precisely in the part of it usually dubbed realism.”' 
Though this school is certainly less stuck in the “intellectual backwater of the 
main currents of Western social theory”59 60 than some of its critics maintain, it 
is undeniable that there is an increasing plurality of perspectives and that many 
of the foundations of the “theory” are open to debate. The “challenges to the
59 For an overview of this never ending debate, see Stefano Guzzini, The Continuing 
Story o f Death Foretold. Realism in International Relations / International Political 
Economy (Florence: European University Institute, 1992, SPS Working Papers no. 92/20), 
chapter 16.
60 Jim George and David Campbell, “Patterns of Dissent and the Celebration of 
Difference: Critical Social Theory and International Relations,” International Studies 
Quarterly, vol. 34, no. 3 (1990), p. 272. After all major “Western” social theorists (James 
S. Coleman for instance) continue to operate with and refine individualist methodologies 
without integrating or accepting the post-structuralist, critical, or linguistic theories 
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discipline” are founded on the alleged incapacity of realism to deal with the 
study of “the international”, either in terms of raising relevant empirical 
questions or in terms of its theoretical baggage. One off-spring of the debate has 
been the development of international political economy. To cover the entire 
debate is both impossible and unnecessary for the present purposes. Suffice it 
to say that Badie’s work joins in the part of the debate which is concerned with 
questioning the adequacy of the theoretical ground of the discipline.
Mainstream IR has come under attack for its failure to question its own 
perception of the world. Authors of various intellectual traditions have 
questioned developments within the IR tradition and their arguments have piled 
up in front of a main-stream which seems both unwilling and unable to take a 
stand on them. Who and what are excluded from IR debates and why? What are 
the implications of these exclusions (Ashley)? What are the foundations of the 
discipline and what do they imply? what are the implications of a “God’s-eye 
view on the world” (Walker)?
By accepting the idea of plurality of states, by challenging the notion of 
sovereignty and the adequacy of a universal logic to explain the international 
system and by denying it the specificity that realists would accord it, Badie 
finds himself in the camp of some of these critics. They are sometimes lumped 
together with Marxist, Gramiscian, and Frankfurt school critics, under the 
heading of reflectivists. They themselves prefer the more noble denomination 
“dissidents” and see themselves as speaking from “exile” (International Studies 
Quarterly—exile?!).61 Like these self-proclaimed marginals, Badie is question­
ing the founding myths of theories, the binary construction of identities, the 
reification of specific categories and concepts such as sovereignty, and the taken 
a priori nature of the categories for apprehending policies and events.62 As is 
rather natural the categories and concepts questioned are precisely the same: the 
concepts of state, sovereignty, individual, and community. The outcome is also 
equivalent: through denial of the special status of the international as well as of 
an assumed universal logic Badie’s position is close to Walker’s. Walker prefers 
the notion of “World Politics” to IR, as “politics” indicates that the problems
61 For an overview of the debates, see Robert O. Keohane’s defense of mainstream 
IR, International Institutions and State Power. Essays in International Relations Theory 
(Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), particularly the essay entitled “International Institutions. 
Two Approaches.” For the critique see, “Special Issue: Speaking the Language of Exile. 
Dissidence in International Studies,” International Studies Quarterly vol. 34, no. 3 (1990).
62 See notably “Communauté, Individualisme, et Culture; and Formes et Transforma­
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of the rest of political science are shared also by the IR community.
At the core of the methodology proposed by these “dissidents”, among 
whom we now include Badie, is the call for the introduction of history and 
space, i.e historical and social context. The important point, though, is not the 
idea of space and time as such, but rather the way in which they are to be 
integrated in the analysis. Keohane’s response to this call provides a clear 
example of how main-stream I.R and dissidents talk at cross purposes.63 
Keohane sees no need for abandoning the “rationalist” approach to introduce 
time and space into the discussion. He retains only the need to contextualise 
both concepts and institutions from the critique and considers an individualistic, 
rational choice perspective well equipped to do this:64 “In quite a short time 
research stimulated by rationalistic theory has proposed new hypotheses about 
why governments create and join international regimes, and the conditions under 
which these institutions wax or wane”.65 In other words, a “rationalist 
approach” can account for time and space alike.
Like Aron, Keohane infers nothing from the critique to shake the founda­
tions of the “rationalist approach”. While accepting the fact that there are 
different rules and norms at work and that these have to be set in their historical 
context to be apprehended, he denies the concomitant claim that this alters the 
functioning of the theory. Yet, this is precisely the point of R. Walker’s critique 
of Keohane:
The epistemological claim to a universally applicable scientific method thus 
coexists quite uneasily with the contrary claim, articulated in ontological, ethical, 
and ideological forms that human life is fragmented...66
To pose the issue in terms of a position in relation to rationality might not 
be false, but is certainly not the way that the would-be-dissidents (or Badie for 
that matter) would like to see their position. They tend to avoid the seemingly 
endless debates to which there might be no answer. Consequently, the issue of 
relativism often remains obscured or neglected. Instead, the authors in this 
tradition point to their contribution in terms of taking problems seriously and 
not shying away because there are no clear and easy answers.
63 See Robert Keohane, International Institutions and State Power, pp. 170 ft'.
64 ibid, pp. 171 ff.
65 ibid, p. 173.
66 R.B.J. Walker, “History and Structure in the Theory of International Relations,” 
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The key issues raised by most recent forms of critical theory, whatever their 
differences, is not some primordial divide between the modern and the 
post-modern—and thus between the objectivist and the relativist, the responsible 
and the irresponsible—but the erasure of critical scholarship in the name of an 
epistemologically legitimated social science that continues to treat ontological 
difficulties much as King Canute treated the incoming tide.67
Conclusion
Now, if all this is already there, why bring in Badie? The answer lies partly in 
his contribution of new elements to the debate, notably regarding the conception 
and practise of politics in the non-Western and particularly Arab world. Badie 
examines the central concepts of the discipline in the light of his material and 
shows the plural meanings of notions such as community, individual, state. 
More importantly, Badie poses with particular clarity the problem—raised by 
a large number of dissidents— of the implications of the multitude of worlds. 
In a concrete way, at times absent from the more philosophical “discourses” and 
“texts” of other critics of mainstream 1R, Badie confronts the issues of the left 
out, the culturally and socially determined. Walker questions the founding 
myths, the binary categories developed to understand the world by tracing the 
historical evolution of specific concepts through their philosophical treatment. 
A rereading of Machiavelli becomes one way of contesting the claims to 
universality of realism and its attachment to a “fixed point”.68 Badie would 
arrive at a similar conclusion, but through the use of a comparative method 
allowing him to demonstrate the evolving meanings of one concept in different 
traditions and thereby to abolish the foundation of the universalizing claims 
attached to it. Both are ways of introducing time and space into the analysis 
“seriously” enough to allow them real importance.
Badie does what many critics of the orthodox IR call for. He focuses on the 
overlooked in concrete terms, acknowledges “other worlds” and attempts to 
spell them out. He gives solid evidence for various perceptions of the world and
67 R.B.J. Walker, “Gender and Critique in the Theory of International Relations,” in 
V. Spike Peterson (ed.), Gendered States. Feminist (Re)Visions o f International Relations 
Theory (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992), p. 199.
68 R.B.J. Walker, “The Prince and the Pauper: Traditions, Modernity, and Practice in 
the Theory of International Relations,” in James Der Derian and Michael J. Shapiro (eds), 
International/lntertextual Relations. Postmodern Readings o f World Politics (Lexington, 
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the effects of these on the system as such. This applied way of raising 
theoretical issues may enhance the debate between applied and theoretical 
scholars. Badie’s theoretical contributions should be welcomed by those who 
want applied research programmes, object to an excessively abstract debate and 
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